➊ William Clifford The Will To Believe Analysis

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William Clifford The Will To Believe Analysis



I do believe that this kind of organization of thoughts and beliefs is very smart and works William Clifford The Will To Believe Analysis well. Our explanations are meant only as starting places for William Clifford The Will To Believe Analysis own investigation into literary theory. William William Clifford The Will To Believe Analysis Clifford Differences Between Walter Mitty Book And Movie that a belief …show more content… He does William Clifford The Will To Believe Analysis by stating that William Clifford The Will To Believe Analysis should not just be one thing or the William Clifford The Will To Believe Analysis, he thinks that they William Clifford The Will To Believe Analysis be categorized. There are repercussions if intelligence services fail to analyse. After James began to consider the possible different explanations for the ambiguities that exist in human consciousness, he began to experiment with drugs, William Clifford The Will To Believe Analysis nitrous oxide. James wrote his essay, The Will to Believe, as a response to Robert Packs An Echo Sonnet essay where he endorsed a philosophy called pragmatism.

What Pragmatism Means - William James

This greatly expanded our qualitative understanding of how objects interact in space. Crucially, it also provided the means for quantitatively calculating the spatial consequences of those interactions. The resulting geometric algebra, as he called it, eventually realized the long sought goal [i] of creating an algebra that mirrors the movements and projections of objects in 3-dimensional space. Moreover, Clifford's algebraic schema extends to higher dimensions. The algebraic operations have the same symbolic form as they do in 2 or 3-dimensions.

The importance of general Clifford algebras has grown over time, while their isomorphism classes - as real algebras - have been identified in other mathematical systems beyond simply the quaternions. The realms of real analysis and complex analysis have been expanded through the algebra H of quaternions, thanks to its notion of a three-dimensional sphere embedded in a four-dimensional space. Quaternion versors , which inhabit this 3-sphere, provide a representation of the rotation group SO 3. The algebra of dual quaternions is used to express screw displacement , a common mapping in kinematics. As a philosopher, Clifford's name is chiefly associated with two phrases of his coining, mind-stuff and the tribal self. The former symbolizes his metaphysical conception, suggested to him by his reading of Baruch Spinoza , [4] which Clifford defined as follows: [17].

That element of which, as we have seen, even the simplest feeling is a complex, I shall call Mind-stuff. A moving molecule of inorganic matter does not possess mind or consciousness ; but it possesses a small piece of mind-stuff. When molecules are so combined together as to form the film on the under side of a jelly-fish, the elements of mind-stuff which go along with them are so combined as to form the faint beginnings of Sentience. When the molecules are so combined as to form the brain and nervous system of a vertebrate, the corresponding elements of mind-stuff are so combined as to form some kind of consciousness; that is to say, changes in the complex which take place at the same time get so linked together that the repetition of one implies the repetition of the other.

When matter takes the complex form of a living human brain, the corresponding mind-stuff takes the form of a human consciousness, having intelligence and volition. Regarding Clifford's concept, Sir Frederick Pollock wrote:. Briefly put, the conception is that mind is the one ultimate reality; not mind as we know it in the complex forms of conscious feeling and thought, but the simpler elements out of which thought and feeling are built up.

The hypothetical ultimate element of mind, or atom of mind-stuff, precisely corresponds to the hypothetical atom of matter, being the ultimate fact of which the material atom is the phenomenon. Matter and the sensible universe are the relations between particular organisms, that is, mind organized into consciousness , and the rest of the world. This leads to results which would in a loose and popular sense be called materialist. But the theory must, as a metaphysical theory, be reckoned on the idealist side. To speak technically, it is an idealist monism. Tribal self , on the other hand, gives the key to Clifford's ethical view, which explains conscience and the moral law by the development in each individual of a 'self,' which prescribes the conduct conducive to the welfare of the 'tribe.

Animated by an intense love of his conception of truth and devotion to public duty, he waged war on such ecclesiastical systems as seemed to him to favour obscurantism , and to put the claims of sect above those of human society. The alarm was greater, as theology was still unreconciled with Darwinism ; and Clifford was regarded as a dangerous champion of the anti-spiritual tendencies then imputed to modern science.

In his essay, "The Ethics of Belief", Clifford argues that it is immoral to believe things for which one lacks evidence. The ship-owner had doubts suggested to him that the ship might not be seaworthy: "These doubts preyed upon his mind, and made him unhappy. At last, "he succeeded in overcoming these melancholy reflections. Clifford argues that the ship-owner was guilty of the deaths of the passengers even though he sincerely believed the ship was sound: " [H]e had no right to believe on such evidence as was before him. The ship-owner would be no less guilty: his wrongdoing would never be discovered, but he still had no right to make that decision given the information available to him at the time.

Clifford famously concludes: "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence. As such, he is arguing in direct opposition to religious thinkers for whom 'blind faith' i. This paper was famously attacked by pragmatist philosopher William James in his " Will to Believe " lecture. Often these two works are read and published together as touchstones for the debate over evidentialism , faith , and overbelief. Though Clifford never constructed a full theory of spacetime and relativity , there are some remarkable observations he made in print that foreshadowed these modern concepts: In his book Elements of Dynamic , he introduced "quasi-harmonic motion in a hyperbola". He wrote an expression for a parametrized unit hyperbola , which other authors later used as a model for relativistic velocity.

Elsewhere he states: [20]. This passage makes reference to biquaternions , though Clifford made these into split-biquaternions as his independent development. The book continues with a chapter "On the bending of space", the substance of general relativity. Clifford also discussed his views in On the Space-Theory of Matter in In , William Barrett Frankland quoted the Space-Theory of Matter in his book on parallelism: "The boldness of this speculation is surely unexcelled in the history of thought. Up to the present, however, it presents the appearance of an Icarian flight.

Hermann Weyl , for instance, mentioned Clifford as one of those who, like Bernhard Riemann , anticipated the geometric ideas of relativity. In , Eric Temple Bell published The Development of Mathematics , in which he discusses the prescience of Clifford on relativity: [23]. Cornelius Lanczos summarizes Clifford's premonitions: [26]. Likewise, Banesh Hoffmann writes: [27]. In , Ruth Farwell and Christopher Knee examined the record on acknowledgement of Clifford's foresight. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. English mathematician and philosopher. For other people with the same name, see William Clifford disambiguation.

Exeter , Devon , England. Madeira , Portugal. This page is a candidate to be copied to Wikiquote using the Transwiki process. If the page can be expanded into an encyclopedic article, rather than a list of quotations, please do so and remove this message. Geometric Algebra for Physicists. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. ISBN Basel, Germany: Springer. Geometric Algebra for Computer Scientists. Amsterdam: Morgan Kaufmann. A Cambridge Alumni Database. University of Cambridge. Such Silver Currents. Cambridge: The Lutterworth Press. New York: Macmillan and Company. Prindle, Weber and Schmidt. Graph Theory: Oxford University Press. American Journal of Mathematics. JSTOR Advances in Applied Clifford Algebras.

Bibcode : arXiv S2CID PMID Common Sense of the Exact Sciences. London: Kegan Paul, Trench and Co. Theories of Parallelism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Raum Zeit Materie. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. If we believe propositions on less than conclusive evidence, we initiate processes that will lead to a more thorough testing of the hypothesis, and perhaps to a better articulation of it. Their differences may be less than is often supposed. We can see this by considering their views about the role of belief in science. According to James, this is almost always the case in science. The most useful investigator, because the most sensitive observer, is always he whose eager interest in one side of the question is balanced by an equally keen nervousness lest he become deceived.

Science has organized this nervousness into a regular technique , her so-called method of verification; and she has fallen so deeply in love with the method that one may say that she has ceased to care for truth by itself at all. James Peirce seems to hold that, in pure science, the avoidance of error should be given priority. This provides an interesting contrast between Peirce and van Fraassen. Peirce holds that current philosophical results are not a matter of belief but are, rather, the objects of more tentative forms of acceptance.

Even if fallibilist scientists allow that the sort of acceptance scientific belief involves is more tentative than ordinary common-sense beliefs, if may be appropriate to treat this as a variety of scientific belief. Whether we should believe depends upon context: we should be tentative about believing current scientific results; and whether we should believe is a function of how ready will be to risk possessing a false belief on the matter. Both pragmatists have contextualist views about when we should be ready to believe a proposition. We can provide a positive justification for some of our beliefs.

We can point to evidence that supports them or a proof that demonstrates their truth. However, for many of our beliefs, we can provide no positive justification at all. We may forget how we acquired them. If we have no positive justification for accepting some proposition, are we justified in believing it? Epistemic conservatives reject this Cartesian assumption. Beliefs are justified unless we have positive reason for doubting them:. This opens up a range of interesting issues about just what constitutes a reason for doubting a stably held belief. Why are we justified in ignoring the sorts of hypothetical reasons for doubt which are proposed by proponents of skepticism?

It is also found in the writings of pragmatist philosophers such as Isaac Levi and Peirce see Hookway Acknowledging the influence of Schiller and Dewey, he considers how we arrive at new opinions, concluding that process by which this occurs is always the same. The individual has a stock of old opinions already, but he meets a new experience that puts them to a strain. Somebody contradicts them; or in a reflective moment he discovers that they contradict each other; or he hears of facts with which they are incompatible; or desires arise in him which they cease to satisfy. The result is an inward trouble to which his mind till then had been a stranger, and from which he seeks to escape by modifying his previous mass of opinions.

He saves as much of it as he can, for in this matter of belief we are all extreme conservatives. So he tries to change first this opinion and then that […] until at last some new idea comes up which he can graft upon the ancient stock with a minimum disturbance of the latter. He suggests that taking this seriously was indispensable if we are to recognize what is wrong with many of the criticisms made of pragmatism. Rationalists and some other realists and empiricists offer different candidate explanations of why and how our opinions are constrained by reason, or by the facts, or by experience.

Loyalty to the older facts provides another kind of constraint. They reflect what we know fallibly about reality and our determination to be loyal to these older facts and thus indicate thus we want to revise our beliefs in a way that preserves what we take ourselves to know. We trust our beliefs until given reason to doubt them, not whenever we think it would suit us to change them. It is useful to distinguish two versions of the sort of view that James defends, two contexts from which his argument may be employed. In most cases, beliefs are innocent unless we think there is a positive reason for doubting them.

It may be suggested that the suspicion that the belief has been sustained by non-evidential considerations does not provide positive reason for doubting it. This is the version that can seem problematic: James spears to recommend that this person should manipulate his beliefs by seeking out experiences which would contribute to the onset of religious belief. Such views have taken a number of different forms. Some virtue epistemologists argue that success in scientific investigations — or in other kinds of investigations — depends upon the possession of appropriate traits.

For example, we must possess curiosity, open-mindedness, and diligence in testing theories, and so on. One way in which our epistemic evaluations are manifested, according to this kind of view, is through affective or emotional responses. Just as fear alerts us to salient threats to our lives or activities, so doubt, epistemic anxiety, alerts us to salient problems, or salient weaknesses in our epistemic position. Epistemic virtues are varies, but we would expect that success in our reasoning and inquiry depends upon possessing traits such as curiosity, open-mindedness, and other traits.

Whether they are the whole of his argument may be less clear. Clifford W. DePaul M. Zagzebski eds. DeRose K. Van Fraassen B. Hookway Ch. Greco ed. James W. Levi I. Misak ed. Canadian Journal of Philosophy , supplementary volume 24, Peirce C. Peirce: A Chronological Edition , M. Fisch, E. Moore, C. Kloesel, N. Houser et al. Refered to as W with volume number. Hartshorne, P. Burks eds. Author retains copyright and grants the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.

William Clifford The Will To Believe Analysis I. Refered to as Media Influence On Haiti with volume number. If I can bring William Clifford The Will To Believe Analysis to believe that I will succeed, then I am not irrational to do Coping Defense Mechanisms.

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