⌚ Why Did The Provisional Government Fail

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Why Did The Provisional Government Fail



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A Level: Essay on the fall of the Provisional Government

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Main article: Irish general election. Oireachtas Members Database. Archived from the original on 8 November Retrieved 1 June Retrieved 5 October The Irish Times. Archived from the original on 16 November Retrieved 26 September Archived from the original on 30 November An Rolla" [The Roll Call]. Oireachtas in Irish. Archived from the original on 6 September Houses of the Oireachtas. April Archived from the original on 26 September Retrieved 20 February Archived from the original on 31 August Retrieved 31 August Archived from the original on 22 August Cork University Press. ISBN Archived from the original on 25 February Retrieved 25 February — via www.

Retrieved 25 February Cosgrave navigational boxes. Taoisigh of Ireland. Previous offices under earlier constitutions. Michael Collins W. Irish Leaders of the Opposition. Cosgrave Thomas F. De Valera Cabinet — Cathal Brugha Michael Collins W. Cosgrave Arthur Griffith Austin Stack. O'Kelly J. Griffith Cabinet Collins Cabinet Chairman of the Provisional Government : Michael Collins.

Ernest Blythe W. Cosgrave Patrick Hogan Michael Hayes. Cosgrave Cabinet Chairman of the Provisional Government : W. Cosgrave Cabinet — President of the Executive Council : W. O'Sullivan J. Ministers for Finance of Ireland. Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Ireland. Ministers for Justice of Ireland. Ministers for Defence of Ireland. Richard Mulcahy Cathal Brugha W. Fine Gael. Fitzgerald Cummins Buttimer. Crotty Creed Enright Lowry J. Centrist Democrat International. Authority control. France data United States. Namespaces Article Talk. Views Read Edit View history. Help Learn to edit Community portal Recent changes Upload file. Download as PDF Printable version.

Wikimedia Commons Wikisource. In office 6 December — 9 March Kevin O'Higgins Ernest Blythe. Michael Collins as Chairman of the Provisional Government. In office 9 March — 11 January Richard Mulcahy. In office 20 June — 30 May In office 20 April — 15 May In office 22 August — 6 December Like many micromanagers, Sanchez also tended to criticize harshly in public. Sanchez inherited no real war strategy from Franks or the Bush administration, and he did nothing to remedy that deficit.

This lack of any coherent strategy manifested itself in the radically different approaches taken by different Army divisions in the war. Observers moving from one part of Iraq to another were often struck by the extent to which each division was fighting its own war, with its own assessment of the threat, its own solutions, and its own rules of engagement. Baghdad was its own separate situation, exceedingly complex and changing from block to block. Meanwhile, in far-northern Iraq, Petraeus and the st Airborne Division made a separate peace, ignoring many of the anti-Baathist rules promulgated by the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad and conducting negotiations with the government of Syria to provide electricity to Mosul.

One reason for such distinctly diverse approaches was that conditions were very different in each of these areas. But another reason was that each division commander received little strategic guidance from Sanchez. Sanchez did not seem willing to learn from and adapt to the conflict. Some commanders at the tactical level took effective approaches, but these were ignored or even discouraged by Sanchez.

For example, a Florida National Guard battalion stationed in Ramadi in was more adept at police work than most military units, because its ranks included many members of the Miami-Dade police force. It emphasized local policing, setting up an academy and an Iraqi force, and also helped cooperative sheikhs win contracts for reconstruction projects, as an Army intelligence officer who served in Iraq recalled to me in When General John Abizaid, who had replaced Franks as the chief of Central Command, visited Ramadi, he was so impressed with operations that he told Sanchez to go there and get the same briefing. Sanchez did so, apparently rather unhappily. Not knowing how else to put down an insurgency, some divisions indiscriminately detained thousands of Iraqis and shipped them off to Abu Ghraib prison and other detention centers, where the Army lacked sufficient guards and interrogators to hold and sort them.

Short-term thinking guided many of these decisions. When the world learned in the spring of that American soldiers had sadistically abused prisoners at Abu Ghraib, Sanchez treated the scandal as a breakdown of discipline among a few enlisted soldiers, rather than a problem caused by a series of leadership failures, most notably his tolerance of massive roundups. An Army intelligence expert later estimated that more than 85 percent of the detainees had no intelligence value.

Even if widespread detentions were the right approach—and to this day, some Army officers maintain that they were—Sanchez failed to ensure that he had a back office capable of processing all those prisoners. Worst of all, Abu Ghraib was run by a small, undertrained, poorly led Army Reserve unit that amused itself by playing brutal games with prisoners. Sanchez approved two interrogation policy memoranda that were, at best, poorly considered and poorly written.

The answer is that simple. But he did not do so, he said, in part because she was due to rotate home in less than two months. Nor was Sanchez himself relieved, despite his dismal record. The end of the book dwells not on the mess he helped make of Iraq, nor on the American troops who were stuck there, nor on the American and Iraqi dead, but on how he did not get a promotion he believes he was promised. At least in Iraq I know who my enemies are and what to do about them.

He was wrong, of course: Sanchez was even more out of his depth in Iraq than he was in Washington. In the spreading war in Mesopotamia, he had only a dim idea of who his foes were, and even less sense of how to deal with them. Sanchez was succeeded in Iraq in mid by General George Casey, a deeply conventional man who tried to persuade the Army to operate unconventionally. Casey was an Army insider—a four-star general and the son of the highest-ranking American casualty of the Vietnam War, a division commander who was killed in a July helicopter crash.

He knew the Army needed to start operating differently in Iraq. He developed a formal campaign plan, something Sanchez had never done. More significant, he asked two counterinsurgency experts, Colonel Bill Hix and retired Lieutenant Colonel Kalev Sepp, to review the actions of individual units and make suggestions. His misgivings confirmed, Casey started a Counterinsurgency Academy at the large military base in Taji, just north of Baghdad. There, he gave newcomers a one-week immersion course in the basics of irregular warfare.

Just capturing a known insurgent is not necessarily a tactical gain, the academy taught the students, if it is done in such a way that it creates new enemies. Even so, both Casey and the Army were slow to adjust. For example, a key tenet of classic counterinsurgency theory is that troops should live in small outposts among the local people, to better understand them and to deter the enemy from controlling them.

Yet in and , Casey was determined to close small outposts and move his troops onto a few very big bases. Torn and confused, trying to change course while under assault by a sophisticated group of enemies who adapted constantly, the American military under Casey did not make progress in Iraq. In , it recorded 26, insurgent attacks. In , that number increased to 34, Fighting in Iraq intensified in July, especially in and around the capital. That summer there were an average of 50 insurgent attacks a day just in Anbar province, west of Baghdad. By the end of the summer, the capital had been largely ethnically cleansed, with Sunnis reduced to a few embattled enclaves on its western side.

Insurgents were detonating about 1, roadside bombs a week. An estimated 2 million Iraqis, most of them Sunni, had fled the country, and an equal number had been classified as internally displaced. Casey and those around him did not seem to grasp how quickly the situation was deteriorating. Admiral William Fallon, the American military commander for the Pacific, visited Baghdad in midsummer. When he returned home, he called retired Army General Jack Keane, an influential figure behind the scenes in Washington. This thing is going down around him. On August 17, , during a video briefing to top national-security officials, he said he wanted to stick with his plan to turn Baghdad over to Iraqi security forces by the end of the year.

Vice President Dick Cheney, watching from Wyoming, was troubled by that comment. In the wake of that briefing, the vice president began poking around for a different strategy—and different generals to lead it. Among those he met with was Colonel H. McMaster, the author of Dereliction of Duty , a book about the failures of top American generals in Vietnam. The colonel told Cheney that the U. In December, Casey was told to leave Iraq within weeks rather than in the spring of , as he had planned. He was replaced by General Petraeus, who took a sharply different approach, moving his troops out to live among the people and getting insurgents to stop fighting Americans by putting almost , Iraqi fighters on the American payroll.

Petraeus ultimately extracted the United States from Iraq, but hardly left behind a stable democracy. Consider a U. In such a circumstance, it is hard to imagine the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan being allowed to meander for years without serious strategic review and redirection. Yet meander they did, at the cost of many thousands of lives—both American and Iraqi.

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